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U.S. SUPREME COURT
U.S. Term Limits, Inc., et al., v.
Thornton, et al.,
U.S. __, 95 D.A.R. 6496,
No. 93-1456 (May 22, 1995).
Arkansas' Term Limit Amendment
to State Constitution Restricting
Candidate Eligibility for U.S. Con-
gress Violates Federal Constitution
By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that congressional term limits en-
acted by states are unconstitutional; in a
ruling which affects such laws in 23 states
(including California), the Court opined
that states may not place limits on the
terms of members of Congress, and that
federal term limits may only be enacted at
the federal level by amending the Consti-
tution. Writing for the majority, Justice
John Paul Stevens stated that "allowing
individual states to craft their own quali-
fications for Congress would thus erode
the structure envisioned by the framers...
to form a 'more perfect union."'
U.S. NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent
Control Board, et al.,
67 F.3d 266, 95 D.A.R. 13670,
No. 94-55479 (Oct. 10, 1995).
City Rent Control Board May
Regulate Length and Place of
Public Comments at Meetings
In this proceeding, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Santa Monica Rent Control Board may
adopt cregulations governing when the
public may address the Board if the re-
quirements are reasonable, content-neu-
tral "time, place, and manner estrictions"
that are not intended to suppress a partic-
ular viewpoint. In so deciding, the court
noted that citizens are not entitled to exer-
cise their first amendment rights when-
ever and wherever they wish; for example,
the court explained that although a speaker
at a public body's meeting may not be
stopped from speaking because the mod-
erator disagrees with the viewpoint he is
expressing, it may stop him if his speech
becomes irrelevant or repetitious.
Voting Rights Coalition, et al., v.
Wilson, et al.,
60 F.3d 1411, 95 D.A.R. 9798,
No. 95-15449 (July 24, 1995).
California Must Comply with
National Voter Registration Act
of 1993
In his official capacity, Governor Wil-
son directed the appropriate officials of
the state of California not to comply with
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(42 U.S.C.A. section 1973gg- Ito -10), on
constitutional grounds. In reviewing the
constitutionality of the so-called "motor
voter law," which directs states to provide
voter registration where the state receives
applications for motor vehicle driver's li-
censes, the Ninth Circuit explained that
three provisions of the Constitution must
be considered: Article I, section 4, which
vests in Congress the power to alter state
laws pertaining to the times, places, and
manner of electing representatives and sen-
ators; Article I, section 2, which gives the
states the power to fix the qualifications of
the voters; and the Tenth Amendment.
After reviewing these provisions, the
court concluded that Congress may re-
quire state agencies to carry out voter reg-
istration for the election of representatives
and senators, and that in enacting the Act,
Congress explicitly sought to regulate the
times, places, and manner of electing only
representatives and senators, not state and
local officials. In response to Wilson's
argument that the Act will have a signifi-
cant impact on the state's registration pro-
cedures applicable to elections of state and
local officials, the Ninth Circuit stated that
it "cannot determine the extent to which,
if at all, these changes impinge on the
legitimate retained sovereignty of the states"
under the Constitution, and that "[c]learly,
the Constitution denies to the states any
power to obstruct the exercise by Con-
gress of its power to make or alter the
times, places, and manner of electing rep-
resentatives or senators." Accordingly, the
court ordered Wilson and the state of Cal-
ifornia to comply with the law.
CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT




Court Declines to Rewrite
Proposition 73
In a 4-3 decision, the California Su-
preme Court declined to reimpose cam-
paign contribution limits in state and local
elections when it refused to correct a flaw
in an initiative approved by voters in 1988.
In June 1988, voters approved two cam-
paign reform initiatives; Proposition 73
took effect because it received more votes
than Proposition 68, which would have
given candidates some public funds. [11:1
CRLR 153-54] Proposition 73 imposed
contribution limits in state and local races;
individuals could contribute $1,000 to a
candidate, political committees could con-
tribute $2,500, and political parties $5,000.
However, in 1990 a federal judge over-
turned Proposition 73, declaring that an-
nual contribution limits based on a July-
to-June fiscal year benefitted incumbents
and hindered challengers; according to the
judge, challengers would only have two
years to raise funds, while incumbents
have three or more. [10:4 CRLR 189-90]
After Proposition 73 was overturned, Prop-
osition 68 proponents asked the California
Supreme Court o reactive that initiative;
in declining, several justices said in foot-
notes that the court had not yet been asked
to correct the flaw in Proposition 73 and
reimpose it under the doctrine of judicial
reconstitution. [14:1 CRLR 181] Accord-
ingly, Proposition 73 sponsors asked the
court to correct and reimpose that initia-
tive.
Although the four justices who declined
to reimpose Proposition 73 cited various
reasons for their decision, the court in
general stated that there is no way to re-
write the measure so that it would pass
constitutional muster. In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Marvin Baxter contended that
the plurality opinion "thwarts the people's
precious right of initiative, and will surely
exacerbate the perceived crisis of confi-
dence in our electoral system."







League, et al., v. Lungren,
38 Cal. App. 4th 497,
95 D.A.R. 12761,






The Third District Court of Appeal has
held that freedom of speech is unconstitu-
tionally abridged by a statute which re-
quires a proponent of an initiative measure
to certify that no dedicated appropriation
has been included in the measure in ex-
change for a campaign contribution for
purposes of qualifying the measure for the
ballot.
SB 424 (Chapter 1189, Statutes of 1991)
added former Elections Code section 5358
(now section 9607) to prohibit any person
from including in the text of an initiative
petition an appropriation of money for a
particular project in exchange for either a
campaign contribution or a pledge for a
campaign contribution for the purpose of
qualifying the initiative for the ballot. SB
424 also amended former Elections Code
section 3502 (now section 9002) to re-
quire initiative proponents, prior to circu-
lation of an initiative petition for signa-
tures, to submit a sworn statement to the
Attorney General (AG) that no appropria-
tions prohibited by section 5358 have been
included in the measure. Plaintiff PCL
submitted an initiative measure to the AG
for preparation of a title and summary, but
did not include the sworn statement re-
quired by section 3502 disclaiming the
inclusion in the measure of prohibited ap-
propriations. The AG refused to prepare a
title and summary for the proposed mea-
sure, and PCL commenced this action.
The Third District first concluded that
strict scrutiny is applicable to this inquiry,
since SB 424 has "more than an incidental
impact on first amendment rights." In order
to satisfy strict scrutiny, a law must be
neither vague nor substantially over- or
underinclusive, and it must further an over-
riding state interest yet be drawn with
narrow specificity to avoid any unneces-
sary intrusion on first amendment rights.
The court concluded that although SB 424
was enacted to, among other things, pre-
vent corruption in the electoral process, it
"is not narrowly tailored to achieve this
legitimate goal." The court also found that
SB 424 is underinclusive, in that it applies
only to initiative measures in which ap-
propriations are made for "financing, ac-
quisition, or improvement of land, the con-
struction or reconstruction of structures,
improvements, parking structures, and re-
lated facilities"; according to the court,
"[i]f the concerns with corruption which
animated SB 424 are real, they are no less
relevant to initiative measures involving
matters unrelated to the acquisition or con-





In this opinion, the Attorney General
(AG) responded to Assemblymember
Mickey Conroy's inquiry on whether an
assemblymember may use campaign funds
raised for his state legislative office to
campaign for election to the office of county
supervisor; whether an assemblymember
may receive campaign funds from other
candidates for use in campaigning for elec-
tion to the office of county supervisor; and
whether an assemblymember who is pre-
cluded from serving additional terms in
the Assembly may donate his campaign
funds to a public interest or educational
nonprofit organization that the member
establishes or controls.
Among other things, the AG noted that
contributions to and expenditures of polit-
ical campaign funds are governed by the
Political Reform Act of 1974, Govern-
ment Code section 81000 et seq. The AG
also noted that, pursuant o Elections Code
section 10003, a county may by ordinance
or resolution limit campaign contributions
in county elections. After reviewing other
applicable law, the AG concluded that an
assemblymember may use campaign funds,
but not surplus campaign funds under cur-
rent administrative enforcement practice,
raised for his state legislative office to
campaign for election to the office of county
supervisor; an assemblymember may re-
ceive campaign funds from other candi-
dates for use in campaigning for election
to the office of county supervisor unless
prohibited from doing so by county ordi-
nance; and an assemblymember who is
precluded from serving additional terms
in the Assembly may donate his campaign
funds to a public interest or educational
nonprofit organization that the member
establishes or controls if no substantial
part of the proceeds will have a material
effect on the member, his family, or his




In this opinion, the AG responded to
Senator Quentin Kopp's query whether
the legislative body of a local agency which
is subject to the Ralph M. Brown Open
Meeting Act, Government Code section
54950 et seq., may prohibit members of
the public, who speak during the time
permitted on the agenda for public expres-
sion, from commenting on matters that are
not within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the legislative body. In reviewing the
Brown Act, the AG focused on section
54954.3(a), which-among other things-
requires that every agenda for egular meet-
ings provide an opportunity for members
of the public to directly address the legis-
lative body on any item of interest to the
public, before or during the legislative
body's consideration of the item, that is
within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the legislative body, provided that no ac-
tion shall be taken on any item not appear-
ing on the agenda unless the action is other-
wise authorized by section 54954.2(b).
In concluding that the legislative body
of a local agency may prohibit members
of the public from commenting on matters
which are not within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the legislative body, the AG
opined that the legislative intent in enact-
ing section 54954.3(a) appears clear and
unambiguous: "Public comment is to be
allowed only on matters that are "within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the leg-
islative body." According to the AG, the
statute does not grant the public the right
to comment on matters outside the legis-
lative body's subject matter jurisdiction;
to conclude. otherwise would require the




The day after California voters approved
Proposition 187-the so-called "Save Our
State" anti-illegal immigration initiative
[14:4 CRLR 28-29]-in the November
1994 election, attorneys filed eight sepa-
rate legal challenges to the measure in
state and federal courts; the plaintiffs in
those actions include the California League
of United Latin American Citizens, the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Ed-
ucation Fund, and the Center for Human
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Rights and Constitutional Law. [15:2&3
CRLR 218; 15:1 CRLR 1831 The follow-
ing is a status update on the challenges to
the initiative:
-Federal Court. In January 1995, U.S.
District Court Judge Mariana Pfaelzer is-
sued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the challenged provisions
of Proposition 187 until a trial determines
their constitutionality; Pfaelzer found that
most of the measure will probably be found
unconstitutional, and its enforcement would
cause many people to suffer irreparable
harm because they would go without med-
ical care, be kicked out of public school,
or fail to report crimes and abuse to police.
[15:2&3 CRLR 218; 15:1 CRLR 183] On
July 14, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth District upheld the prelimi-
nary injunction issued by Pfaelzer.
In May, a coalition of plaintiffs filed a
motion for summary judgment in the fed-
eral proceeding; Pfaelzer held a July 26
hearing on the motion, and on September
7 asked attorneys for the state to submit
further briefing on why she should let
parts of the initiative stand if others are
unconstitutional on their face.
On November 20, Pfaelzer granted
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion in
great part by striking down key portions
of Proposition 187. Among other things,
Pfaelzer found that the initiative's ban on
public elementary and secondary educa-
tion for illegal immigrants is directly con-
trary to a 1981 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion; and that it is unlawful for the state to
deny to undocumented immigrants feder-
ally-funded health care and social welfare
services to which they are otherwise enti-
tled under federal law. In so doing, Pfaelzer
acknowledged that California voters' "over-
whelming approval of Proposition 187 re-
flects their justifiable frustration with the
federal government's inability to enforce
the immigration laws effectively." How-
ever, Pfaelzer ruled that "[n]o matter how
serious the problem may be,...the author-
ity to regulate immigration belongs exclu-
sively to the federal government and state
agencies are not permitted to assume that
authority. The state is powerless to enact
its own scheme to regulate immigration or
to devise immigration regulations which
run parallel to or purport to supplement
federal immigration laws."
Pfaelzer also stated that further pro-
ceedings could be held on the sections of
the initiative not declared legally invalid;
at this writing, no trial date has been set.
- State Court. In November 1994, San
Francisco Superior Court Judge Stuart Pol-
lak also blocked enforcement of certain
aspects of Proposition 187; specifically,
Judge Pollak issued a temporary restrain-
ing order prohibiting enforcement of the
measure's requirement that undocumented
immigrants be kicked out of the state's
public schools, as well as public colleges
and universities. [15:1 CRLR 183] In Feb-
ruary 1995, Pollak issued a preliminary
injunction blocking enforcement of the
measure's provisions regarding public ed-
ucation. [15:2&3 CRLR 218] At this writ-
ing, the state court action is pending in the
discovery phase; no trial date has been set.
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